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Abstract
This paper develops a more unified organizational economics theory within Strategy. We
begin with perfectly competitive markets derived from the first fundamental welfare theorem
of economics, and develop a parsimonious typology of market frictions. We show how two
primary questions in Strategy −− why firms exist and why some firms outperform others −−
can be evaluated from this market frictions logic. Building on this logic enables more
systematic explanations and predictions concerning governance structures and economic
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This paper develops a more unified organizational economics theory within Strategy. We 
begin  with  perfectly  competitive  markets  derived  from  the  first  fundamental  welfare 
theorem of economics, and develop a parsimonious typology of market frictions. We show 
how two primary questions in Strategy -- why firms exist and why some firms outperform 
others -- can be evaluated from this market frictions logic. Building on this logic enables 
more  systematic  explanations  and  predictions  concerning  governance  structures  and 
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To address two primary questions in the strategic management field -- why firms 
exist (the boundary of the firm) and why some firms outperform others (as measured by 
economic rents and competitive advantage), the extant research literature provides various 
explanations derived from several theoretical perspectives and base disciplines. This paper, 
however, remains focused on contributions from organizational economics (Barney & Ouchi 
1986;  Mahoney  2005).  Transaction  costs  theory  regards  the  transaction  as  the  unit  of 
analysis to examine how to better achieve firm-level cost minimization through organiza-
tional boundary choices, including make-or-buy decisions and governance structure designs 
(Williamson 1993). Property rights theory emphasizes the concepts of ownership as residual 
claimancy (Alchian & Demsetz 1972) and as residual control rights (Grossman & Hart 1986) 
as well as the implications of property rights partitioning for the economic value creation of 
resources (Kim & Mahoney 2005). Agency theory characterizes the construct of the firm as 
a nexus of complete contracts (Holmstrom 1979; Jensen & Meckling 1976) and focuses on 
the economic incentive implications of various  contractual specifications under different 
contexts, including shareholder-manager and employer-employee relationships. The resource- 
based  approach  emphasizes  the  search  for  economic  rents  and  sustainable  competitive 
advantages, treating (the bundle of) resources as the unit of analysis (Amit & Schoemaker 
1993; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993). The dynamic capabilities approach emphasizes individual 
skills, core competencies and organizational routines (Nelson & Winter 1982; Teece, Pisano 
& Shuen 1997). Finally, real options theory incorporates inter-project and inter-temporal 
dimensions to organizational boundary choices as well as the search for economic value 
creation (Bowman & Hurry 1993; Dixit & Pindyck 1994; Kogut 1991). 3 
 
This brief review above reveals at least two points that motivate the current paper. 
First, each organizational economics theory has evolved with its own canonical problem and 
specialized  language,  which  imposes  difficulties  for  developing  a  more  fully-integrative 
paradigm  within  the  strategic  management  field.  Second,  these  research  literatures  are 
somewhat  fragmented  and  while  successful  efforts  have  been  made  to  better  join  these 
theories, such connections have typically been made only in a pair-wise manner, such as:    
(i) transaction costs theory joined with property rights theory (Chi 1994); (ii) property rights 
theory joined with the resource-based approach (Kim & Mahoney 2002); (iii) the resource-
based  approach  joined  with  transaction  costs  theory  (Mahoney  &  Pandian  1992);  and         
(iv) transaction costs theory joined with real options theory (Folta 1998).  
The  current  paper  develops  a  more  unified  organizational  economics  framework 
within strategic management by emphasizing first-order theoretical elements that are the 
common  building  blocks  of  these  theories.  In  particular,  we  develop  a  parsimonious 
typology  of  market  frictions  and  elucidate  their  connections  to  issues  of  governance 
structure choices and economic rents, which are considered within various organizational 
economics  theories.  We  show  that  the  market  frictions  logic  is  well  developed  for 
explaining firm boundary choices, and is also fruitful in moving towards an explanation of 
economic rents. Toward this objective, the next section considers a parsimonious typology 
of  market  frictions,  which  can  be  applied  to  the  canonical  problems  of  organizational 
boundaries  in  transaction  costs  theory,  as  well  as  the  search  for  economic  rents  in  the 
resource-based approach. 4 
 
A Parsimonious Typology of Market Frictions 
   
The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics demonstrates that competitive 
equilibrium  leads  to  efficient  resource  allocation  and  Pareto  efficiency  (Arrow  &  Hahn 
1970). Assumptions contained within this fundamental theorem include: independence in 
consumption and in production (e.g., there are  neither externalities nor inter-project and 
inter-temporal  spillovers),  perfect  information,  perfect  rationality,  and  complete  markets 
(Debreu  1959).  Under  the  neoclassical  competitive  equilibrium  paradigm,  firms  are 
considered as a production function and earn zero economic rents in long-run equilibrium 
(Arrow & Hahn 1970; Cyert, Kumar & Williamson 1993).  
Relaxation of those assumptions of the first fundamental welfare theorem within 
neoclassical  economics has been developed in the extant strategic management research 
literature (Mahoney 2001; Yao 1988). Specifically -- and, in sharp contrast with neoclassical 
economic theory -- the strategic management field posits the construct of market frictions as 
its fundamental premise (Mahoney 2005). Market frictions are manifested in a variety of 
factors such as market power (Caves & Porter 1977); indivisibilities (Scarf 1994) leading to 
economies of scale (Chandler 1990); economies of scope (Teece 1980); sunk costs (Baumol, 
Panzar & Willig, 1982); asset specificity (Williamson 1985); imperfect information (Philps 
1988; Rothschild & Stiglitz 1976); incomplete markets (Arrow 1974); asymmetric inform-
ation (Holmstrom 1979); (negative and positive) externalities (Greenwald & Stiglitz 1986; 
Katz & Shapiro 1985), and positive transaction costs (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975).  
Firms that proactively leverage these market frictions are posited to be more likely to 
obtain economic rents. For example, the development of reputation (Dierickx & Cool 1989; 5 
 
Itami & Roehl 1987) as well as product differentiation through advertising expenditures 
(Sutton 1992) can be deployed to reduce asymmetric information problems on the part of 
consumers, and to capture consumers’ attention. Without such market frictions, there is no 
economic need for firms to exist, and there is no entrepreneurial opportunity for firms to 
generate and sustain positive economic profitability (Coase 1937; Mahoney 2001). Relaxation 
of these assumptions suggests the possibility of economic rents, which is a central topic 
within strategic management research. Therefore, an emphasis on market frictions provides 
a foundation for theory development, and the current paper considers various organizational 
economics theories (listed at the beginning of this paper) derived from this foundation.  
We  next  provide  a  parsimonious,  but  fairly  comprehensive,  typology  of  market 
frictions, which underpins resource-based, transaction costs, as well as other organizational 
economics theories, with the purpose of identifying opportunities for developing a more 
systematic framework concerning the firm’s existence, boundary choice, heterogeneity, and 
economic rents. 
Market Frictions and the Boundary of the Firm 
Figure 1 illustrates a market frictions logic concerning governance, which builds on 
Williamson’s  (1975)  market  and  organizational  failures  framework.  Though  different 
theories  are  concerned  with  different  canonical  problems  (e.g.,  transaction  costs  theory 
focuses  on  governance  choice,  while  the  resource-based  approach  focuses  on  economic 
rents), the current paper develops the proposition that market frictions are fundamental 
building blocks for these organizational economics theories. Analysis of market frictions 
associated  with  a  particular  organizational  economics  theory  enables  identification  of 6 
 
convergences and divergences of these theories. To explain both governance and economic 
rents, we expand Williamson’s (1975) seminal framework to include: (1) human factors;    
(2) decision-making uncertainty; and (3) organizational factors. We consider each of these 
three factors in turn. 
First, the human factors include bounded rationality, in which decision makers are 
intendedly rational,  but  limitedly so  (Simon 1947), and  potential opportunism, which is 
characterized as  self-interest  seeking with  guile  (Williamson  1996). The combination of 
these two human factors are important since bounded rationality leads logically to contracts 
typically  being  incomplete,  and  opportunism  potentially  leads  to  substantial  contractual 
hazards. Such hazards are especially problematic when there is asymmetric information that 
can result in adverse selection (Akerlof 1970) and moral hazard (Holmstrom 1979) problems. 
In  addition,  contractual  hazards  due  to  incomplete  contracts  and  opportunism  may  be 
especially severe with dedicated assets and unilateral commitments in physical, human, and 
site asset specificity (Williamson 1985), which can lead to substantial economic hold-up 
problems (Klein, Crawford & Alchian 1978; Sherry & Teece 2004).  
Second,  in  terms  of  decision-making  uncertainty,  the  presence  of  externalities 
(Coase 1960) can result in price signals no longer being sufficient statistics for the effective 
allocation of resources (Libecap 1989). Somewhat analogous to the externalities problems 
that may be found in inter-firm exchange, the presence of intra-firm spillovers can lead to 
internal transfer pricing that provides a poor signal for the effective allocation of capital 
(Dixit & Pindyck 1994). Further, uncertainty is a central market friction. Indeed, Arrow 
maintains that: “There is one particular failure of the price system … one that is absolutely 
central to the understanding of organizations. I refer to the presence of uncertainty” (1974: 7 
 
33). Under Knightian (1921) uncertainty, it may not be feasible to assign probabilities to 
important contingencies or certain contingencies may not even be considered at all, ex ante. 
Therefore, markets will, by definition, be incomplete (Arrow & Hahn 1970). 
Third,  organizational  factors  include  production  economies  and  capabilities 
(Argyres 1996), which can be an important component of total costs (Walker & Weber 1984). 
Governance inseparability is a construct that enables us to focus on path-dependent processes 
(Arthur  1994).  In  particular,  previous  governance  choice  commitments  both  enable  and 
constrain the viability of future governance decisions (Argyres & Liebeskind 1999). Finally, 
undefined and poorly-defined property rights (Barzel 1989; Demsetz 1967) can substantially 
increase transaction costs, making exchange difficult. It can lead to high measurement costs 
(Barzel 1982; Ouchi 1979) and resources being non-tradeable (Dierickx & Cool 1989).  
Now  that  we  have  considered  the  constructs  in  Figure  1,  we  next  analyze  the 
linkages and inter-relationships of these constructs for the purpose of better explaining and 
predicting governance choices. Therefore, we consider, in turn, linkages from A to  I in 
Figure 1 and their theoretical foundations. 
Linkage A: Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information and Opportunism. A combination 
of  asymmetric  information  and  ex  post  opportunism  results  in  market  frictions,  and  a 
representative example is the insurance problem, where insurance influences the behavior of 
the insured and can lead to moral hazard problems (Holmström 1979). A classic example 
that focuses on the consequences of asymmetric information and ex ante opportunism is 
Akerlof’s  (1970)  “market  for  lemons,”  where  adverse  selection  recursively  drives  out 
suppliers of higher-than-average-quality used cars, and, in equilibrium -- without the aid of 
governance mechanisms, such as warranties for quality assurance -- the market completely 8 
 
collapses. The concept of incomplete markets can be applied to a wide range of phenomena 
where asymmetric information exists (Arrow 1974). 
Uncertainty,  and  asymmetric  information  combined  with  opportunistic  behavior 
between  borrowers  and  lenders  can  lead  to  incomplete  and  imperfect  capital  markets 
(Williamson 1975). Asymmetric information and opportunistic behavior have clearly played 
important  roles  in  recent  Wall  Street  developments.  For  example,  in  September  2008, 
Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank in the United States filed for Chapter 
11  bankruptcy  protection,  ending  its  158-year  history.  One  explanation  for  Lehman 
Brother’s bankruptcy and later liquidation was its heavy involvement in financial derivatives, 
especially involving home mortgages and their subsequent collateralized debt obligations. In 
this  process,  a number  of financial institutions  participated  in various  activities such  as 
borrowing and lending, packaging and re-packaging, securitizing, credit rating, and selling. 
Such a complex process entailing high degrees of specialization exacerbates the problem of 
information asymmetry along the chain of financial derivatives innovation, and imposes 
substantial difficulty in valuing and pricing the financial products being transacted. The fact 
that  some  lending  is,  indeed,  sub-prime  can  be  concealed  as  more  layers  of  financial 
products are derived from it. Such severe information asymmetry problems deteriorate the 
ability of those financial institutions to respond effectively. In addition to dramatic market 
failures, government failure is also responsible since it did not meet its obligations for due 
diligence in its role of monitoring and auditing. Such government shortcomings contain their 
own  elements  of  opportunism  and  asymmetric  information  problems.  In  short,  the  real-
world economy provides us with profound examples of the consequences of organizational 9 
 
and  market  failures  due  to  a  combination  of  uncertainty,  asymmetric  information,  and 
opportunism (e.g., moral hazard problems).  
Linkage  B:  Bounded  Rationality  and  Uncertainty.  The  joint  effects  of  bounded 
rationality and uncertainty result in incomplete contracting, as certain contingencies cannot 
be fully specified ex ante (Arrow 1974; Grossman & Hart 1986). Due to bounded rationality, 
contractual parties are not even remotely capable of foreseeing all relevant contingencies 
that may be involved in implementing a complex contract (Simon 1947; Williamson 1975), 
which results in market imperfections. Further, even with the aid of advanced computing 
technologies, substantial environmental uncertainty still results in contract incompleteness 
(Lajili & Mahoney 2006; Powell & Dent-Micallef 1997).  
Linkage C: Bounded Rationality and Opportunism. Incomplete contracting and sub-
sequent contractual hazards is a derivative condition of bounded rationality and opportunism. 
One  governance  solution  to  mitigate  the  potential  contractual  hazards  associated  with 
incomplete  contracting  is  internalization.  For  example,  a  firm’s  multidivisional  internal 
capital market can attenuate efficiency losses due to asymmetric information (Williamson 
1975). The multidivisional form is able to economize on bounded rationality through the 
loose coupling of tactical and strategic decisions (Chandler 1962), and is able to mitigate 
opportunistic behavior since it has better incentive alignment features because: (a) property 
rights ownership and incentives change, since each division has no preemptive claims on 
cash-flow streams; (b) monitoring changes as internal auditing is typically more effective 
than external auditing; and (c) rewards change since the multidivisional form can provide 
more fine-grained monetary and non-monetary rewards (Mahoney 1992; Williamson 1985). 10 
 
Linkage D: Opportunism and Asset Specificity. Opportunism and asset specificity 
are  two  key  constructs  in  transaction  costs  theory  (Williamson  2003).  The  potential  for 
opportunistic behavior by one of the exchange partners poses possible threats to the other 
exchange partner, especially when the latter has incurred substantial asset-specific invest-
ments. With a concern for the economic hold-up problem from the other exchange partner, 
internalization within the firm may be a better governance choice (Grossman & Hart 1986; 
Klein, Crawford & Alchian 1978). The extant empirical literature largely corroborates the 
prediction that potentially high market frictions due to opportunism and asset specificity 
result in economic safeguards such as internalization to mitigate these contractual hazards 
(De Figuerido & Teece 1996; Lajili, Madunic & Mahoney 2007; Sherry & Teece 2004). 
Linkage E: Asset Specificity and Externalities. In general, externalities and positive 
transaction costs have been a concern in the property rights research literature (Coase 1960; 
North 1990). For our purpose here, we focus on a business context in which market frictions 
are likely to be critical, namely when there is high asset specificity (Williamson 1985). As 
an example, Kim and Mahoney (2002) examine oil field unitization to explicate the effects of 
investments  characterized  by  high  levels  of  asset  specificity,  ill-defined  property  rights, 
(negative) externalities and positive transaction costs. In particular, the negative externalities 
of oil migration towards those oil firms that drill early led to over-drilling at poor location 
choices. Consequently, a substantially sub-optimal aggregate amount of oil extraction was 
experienced for decades in Oklahoma and Texas (Libecap 1989).  
Linkage F: Asset Specificity and Spillovers:  The very same economic problem that 
may occur due to market frictions in inter-firm exchange involving asset specificity and 
externalities  (Libecap  1989)  can  also  occur  with  intra-firm  exchange  involving  asset 11 
 
specificity and spillovers (Kang, Mahoney & Tan 2009). For example, while a “strategic” 
outsourcing of workers may maximize the economic returns for a particular division, the 
benefits these workers provided in consultation with people in other divisions of the same 
company may be lost, in which case the economic returns to the enterprise can be negative. 
Another example of a substantial positive intra-firm spillover is R&D, whose knowledge 
creation may have positive spillover applications to other divisions within the company. 
However, due to potential multidivisional negotiating problems involving investments with 
high-levels of asset specificity, these potential positive spillovers may not be fully realized. 
In other words, the marginal benefits of R&D investment for a particular division may be 
smaller than the marginal costs for that particular division, in which case the investment 
might not occur despite the fact that the total net impact of the R&D investment at the firm-
level would be positive when the full costs and benefits are accounted for in the decision 
calculus. The real options logic explicitly attempts to account for these positive spillovers 
within the construct of expansion and growth options (Dixit & Pindyck 1994). 
Linkage G:  Spillovers and Production Economies & Capabilities. Spillovers can 
occur  with  production  capabilities  that  involve  economies  of  scale  and/or  scope  (Teece 
1982). We emphasize here -- along with Williamson (1975: 83-84) and Teece (1980) -- that 
economies of scope, per se, only explain the co-location of resources. It does not, by itself, 
explain or predict governance choice, which is determined by the extent of market frictions. 
Thus, more refined theory building makes clear that when economies of scope are combined 
with spillovers and market frictions, the governance choice of internalization may be needed 
to achieve more fully the benefits of production economies vis-à-vis markets. 12 
 
Linkage  H:  Spillovers  and  Governance  Inseparability:  Argyres  and  Liebeskind 
(1999) advanced theory by incorporating a time dimension into transaction costs economics 
to explain governance choice from a dynamic perspective. In particular, this line of reasoning 
maintains that governance choices, such as previous contractual commitments entailing sunk 
costs may enable or constrain a firm’s subsequent governance choices. This logic resonates 
with the emerging research literature on dynamic transaction costs theory (Langlois 1992; 
Spiller & Zelner 1997). An example for positive spillovers occurs when learning by doing is 
involved with contracting experience, and thus the decision to contract today may positively 
influence  subsequent  contracting  capabilities  (Mayer  &  Argyres  2004).  An  example  of 
negative  spillovers  would  be  if  internal  procurement,  internal  expansion,  and  program 
persistence biases exist in the vertically-integrated firm (Williamson 1975: 118-122), and 
thus these internal organizational distortions that would constrain future governance choices 
should be included at the outset in the decision calculus.  
Linkage I: Capabilities and Un-defined and Poorly Defined Property Rights.  First, 
as Coase (1960) makes clear, an initial assignment of property rights facilitates subsequent 
trade. If property rights are undefined, markets may completely break down (North 1990).  
Further, if the initial property rights are poorly defined, the market friction consequences 
can still be substantial. Consider a multidivisional firm with highly-related business units 
where residual income to managers is based only on divisional ROA. Such property rights 
within this firm are poorly defined since the managers of these highly-related businesses are 
unlikely to share information under this particular compensation system. Hence, with this 
lack of knowledge transfer, the realized capabilities of such a firm will be far from the 
potential capabilities of this firm. A change in the property rights regime of the firm, where 13 
 
divisional managers are rewarded based on corporate ROE, would almost surely improve 
information  sharing  within  the  firm,  thereby  facilitating  greater  capability-development. 
This  example  illustrates  the  more  general  principle  that  property  rights  and  dynamic 
capabilities are tightly linked (Mahoney 2005;  Wang & Barney 2006). Indeed, the next 
generation of resource-based and dynamic capabilities research should join the governance 
(and property rights) approach with the dynamic capabilities approach (Makadok 2001).  
 In summary, Figure 1 illustrates that the current paper’s developed market frictions 
logic, which joins agency theory, property rights theory, dynamic capabilities & real options 
theory, and transaction costs theory more fully explains and predicts governance structure 
choice. A question that naturally  follows is: can this  market  frictions logic  explain and 
predict economic rents to the same extent as it does for the governance structure question?  
We turn to this important question within our Strategy field in the following section. 
Market Frictions and Economic Rents of Firms
In Figure 2, we outline several fundamental questions in the strategic management 
field, and embed these questions on a foundation of market frictions. The question of why 
firms exist corresponds to the economic analysis concerning the boundary choice of firms, 
and the questions of firm heterogeneity and performance differentials correspond to inquiry 
concerning the economic rents of firms. We submit that: 
The questions of (a) firm boundary choice; (b) firm resource heterogeneity; and 
(c) firm-level economic rents cannot be fully addressed by just one organizational 
economics theory; 
These three fundamental questions within the strategic management field share a 
common foundational antecedent: market frictions; and  
The market frictions that explain economic rents are sufficient market frictions to 
explain why firms exist. 14 
 
Indeed, Mahoney (2001) maintains that market frictions are the critical concepts to 
both resource-based and transaction costs theory, and further posits that the “set of market 
frictions that explain sustainable firm-level rents would be sufficient market frictions to 
explain the existence of the firm” (2001: 655). The current paper advances this proposition 
by considering: What are these market frictions that can explain sustainable firm-level rents?  
To address this research question, we build upon several important works from the extant 
resource-based  literature  (Amit  &  Schoemaker  1993;  Barney  1991;  Grant  1991;  Peteraf 
1993); identify key constructs of this approach; connect and build upon these constructs with 
our developed market frictions logic; and suggest areas where the resource-based approach 
can be advanced further. 
Barney  (1991)  suggests  that  the  search  for  sources  of  sustainable  competitive 
advantage focus on resources that are in demand (i.e., valuable), rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable, the resource-based VRIN criteria, which constitute necessary conditions for 
economic rents. Grant (1991) traces the profit-earning potential of a resource or capability to: 
the extent and sustainability of the competitive advantage established through resources and 
capabilities, and the ability of the firm to appropriate the economic rents generated from its 
resources and capabilities. Amit and Schoemaker (1993) describe desired characteristics of a 
firm’s  resources  and  capabilities  that  are  posited  to  generate  economic  rents,  such  as 
scarcity,  complementarity,  and  appropriability.  And,  Peteraf  (1993)  establishes  the  four 
cornerstones of competitive advantage: (a) superior resources; (b) ex post limits to competition; 
(c) imperfect resource mobility; and (d) ex ante limits to competition. 
 Figure 3 provides a synthesis of the various conditions derived from these seminal 
resource-based articles in the strategic management field in terms of (a) the key conditions 15 
 
that help explain and predict the extent of economic rents that can be established through 
resources  and capabilities;  (b) the primary  conditions  that facilitate  the  sustainability of 
these competitive advantages; and (c) the fundamental conditions that enable appropriation 
of these economic rents.  
Here,  we  join  the  current  paper’s  developed  market  frictions  logic  concerning 
governance  choice  in  Figure  1  with  the  resource-based  logic  outlined  in  Figure  3,  by 
further  explicating  the  connectedness  of  our  market  frictions  logic  across  all  constructs 
contained in Figure 3. In particular, in Figure 3, we connect each resource-based construct 
with one or more market friction constructs.  
(a) Extent of competitive advantages of resources 
For a resource to create firm-level competitive advantage that resource in itself, or in 
combination  with  other  resources  in  the  firm,  must  satisfy  several  conditions  (e.g.,  the 
resource is valuable and rare) and firms can differ in either getting access to, or figuring out 
ways of using these resources. We maintain that one fundamental explanation for such a 
difference is due to market frictions.  
Scarcity/rare: Resources are rare if supply is limited, and expansion in supply cannot 
be easily achieved. Furthermore, resources may be scarcer for some firms than for others if 
the latter have better information to access those scarce resources. Peteraf (1993) maintains 
that the possession of superior resources by some firms within an industry can result from 
asymmetric information about the economic value of those resources when the firms started 
to  develop  them.  A  stronger  form  of  resource  scarcity  is  uniqueness  of  resources,  e.g., 
resources  that  are  created  by  a  firm  and  henceforth  are  specific  to  that  firm.  Imperfect 16 
 
information concerning availability of resources or the way to create resources reinforces 
their scarcity.   
Relevance/value: A resource is relevant/valuable if there is demand for that resource 
or for products derived from it. Barney (1991: 106) regards a resource to have value when it 
enables a firm to conceive of or implement strategies that improve its efficiency or effect-
iveness. Peteraf and Barney (2003) define the “value” of a resource as the perceived benefits 
from a resource above its economic costs. Resource-based logic suggests that obtaining such 
a valuable resource can occur through luck and/or asymmetric information (Barney 1986). 
Heterogeneity: Firms consist of resources that are not commonly employed by all 
firms in an industry.  Heterogeneity is typically assumed in the resource-based approach 
(Peteraf & Barney 2003). But where does such heterogeneity come from? The key market 
friction is asymmetric information about resource attributes and availability. Further, when 
considering  flow-and-stock  dynamics  (Dierickx  &  Cool  1989),  information  asymmetry 
combined with heterogeneity in a resource stock formed at time t influences firms’ future 
strategies in resource procurement, deployment and divesture, and therefore, over time, the 
heterogeneity between firms may increase. Thus, the presence of firm-level heterogeneity 
implies the potential presence of various market frictions, such as asymmetric information, 
uniqueness/asset specificity and bounded rationality/causal ambiguity (Lippman & Rumelt 
1982; Mahoney & Pandian1992).  
Complementarity:  Amit  and  Schoemaker  (1993)  explain  complementarity  as  a 
relationship  between  resources  where  the  relative  magnitude  of  strategic  value  of  one 
resource  may  increase  with  an  increase  in  the  relative  magnitude  of  other  resources 
(Milgrom & Roberts 1990). Such complementarity can occur through positive inter-project 17 
 
spillovers, such as economies of scope (Teece 1980) and through positive inter-temporal 
spillovers, such as asset accumulation or interconnectedness over time (Dierickx & Cool 
1989). This resource complementarity can increase the difficulty in transferring, imitation or 
substitution of any single resource. 
(b) Sustainability of competitive advantages    
By constraining competition, a firm can increase sustainability of its economic rents. 
Therefore, impediments to economic activities (Yao 1988) or market frictions are especially 
relevant for sustainability of competitive advantage. 
Low transferability: Low transferability of resources is an explicit manifestation of 
market frictions. Imperfect resource mobility can result from non-tradable or co-specialized 
assets. A resource may be non-tradable because of: (i) difficulties in pricing the resource due 
to information asymmetry between seller and buyer (e.g., brand image); (ii) impediments in 
transferring due to tacitness and intangibility (e.g., R&D capabilities); (iii) difficulties in 
partitioning (e.g., team-embodied skills); and (iv) isolating mechanisms such as patent and 
trademark  enforcement  (Rumelt  1984).  Moreover,  even  if  a  resource  is  tradable,  the 
potential economic rents from this resource will be attenuated if it is separated from its co-
specialized assets (Teece 1986). 
Inimitability: Inimitability is intrinsically related to low transferability, to the extent 
that some causes of low transferability such as non-tradable or co-specialized resources can 
lead  to  inimitability.  Barney  (1991)  attributes  inimitability  to  path-dependence,  social 
complexity, and causal ambiguity (Lippman & Rumelt 1982), which can be derived from 
market frictions of externalities, spillovers, bounded rationality, and asymmetric information.  18 
 
Non-substitutability: Substitutability or non-substitutability is a relative term, since 
for any resource there can be another resource that at least partially substitutes for the focal 
one,  either  cross-sectionally  or  longitudinally  (Barney  1991).  Therefore,  there  is  often 
imperfect  substitutability  between  firm  resources.  The  resource-based  construct  of  non-
substitutability between resources is strategically important when the resources are valuable, 
rare, and inimitable. Moreover, non-substitutability and inimitability are interrelated. Indeed, 
Barney (1991) suggests that substitutability can take at least two forms, one form is that a 
firm can substitute a similar resource that enables it to conceive of and implement the same 
strategy, and the other form is that different firm resources are strategically equivalent if 
they achieve the same functional outcomes. These two forms of substitutability are similar 
to the resource-based construct of imitability of a resource, where substitutability can also 
be the imitation of a process, and thus can be a dynamic form of imitability. By connecting 
the  conditions  of  inimitability  and  non-substitutability,  market  friction  explanations  for 
inimitability of firm resources are also applicable here.  
Durability: If a strategic resource is not durable (e.g., erosion of physical assets) then 
competitive advantage based upon this resource cannot be sustainable (Dierickx & Cool 
1989; Grant 1991). A focus on the criterion of resource durability leads to the issue of how a 
firm  might  be  able  to  implement  strategies  to  make  its  economic  rents  more  durable. 
Concentrating on this strategic issue leads to more detailed consideration of market friction 
impediments to appropriation of economic rents, which we turn to next. 
(c) Appropriability of economic rents 
Appropriation of economic rents is a necessary condition for economic value capture 
and sustainability. Moreover, low appropriability of economic rents lowers the incentives to 19 
 
invest in resources, activities, and dynamic capabilities in the value-creation process. The 
following conditions influence appropriability of economic rents created by a firm.  
Complementarity: The possession of a complementary resource by a firm can lead to 
it appropriating economic rents. If the firm possesses a co-specialized resource (Teece 1986) 
then there is idiosyncratic bilateral synergy (Mahoney & Pandian 1992: 368) in which each 
firm possessing a co-specialized resource is expected to appropriate some of the gains from 
these joined resources. Even more dramatically, if one of the resources in the combination is 
held by a firm in a competitive factor market while the other firm possesses a valuable, rare 
(unique), inimitable, and non-substitutable resource, then resource-based logic makes clear 
that the firm  possessing  the unique resource will appropriate the  entire  economic value 
created in this resource combination (Barney 1986, 1991). For the purpose of the current 
paper, we emphasize that the market frictions, which result from asset specificity, not only 
help explain why these co-specialized resources are owned by one firm (Teece 1986) but 
also why co-specialized resources lead to economic rents (Mahoney 2001). 
Property rights: Well-defined property rights regimes (e.g., patent and trademark 
protection, and equity share arrangements) provide direct mechanisms for appropriability. In 
contrast, undefined and poorly-defined property rights are fundamental sources of market 
frictions that create misleading price signals  and therefore reduce efficiency in  resource 
allocations (Coase 1960). The implications of property rights regimes for economic rents 
will be considered in the next section of the current paper. 
Organizational governance and incentives: The organizational design of governance 
structures  and  incentive  systems  are  closely  related  to  property  rights  considerations. 
Assignment of residual claimancy (Alchian & Demsetz 1972) and residual rights of control 20 
 
(Grossman & Hart 1986) are important components of organization design. For example, 
Grossman and Hart (1986) show that imperfections in residual control assignments (e.g., the 
contractual party having the greatest potential for increasing aggregate gains is not assigned 
residual control rights) can lead to poor resource allocation within the firm.  In particular, if 
the contractual party contemplating firm-specific investment ex ante is not afforded residual 
control rights ex post, then a farsighted decision-maker will foresee the contractual hazards 
of having at least part of their investment appropriated, and consequently there will likely be 
an underinvestment in firm-specific capabilities (Wang & Barney 2006). 
Embeddedness:  Embeddedness  entails  both  cross-sectional  and longitudinal inter-
connectedness of resources (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Consider the example of a university 
professor of chemistry who is tied to a university-owned research laboratory vis-à-vis a 
business school professor who has little ties to the physical resources. The embeddedness 
argument  maintains  that  ownership  of  the  physical  asset  leads  to  control  over  human 
resources (Grant 1991; Hart 1995). In particular, the owner of the physical resource (i.e., the 
university) is  in  the position to  appropriate more of the  economic value created by the 
professor of chemistry than the relatively more mobile professor of business.  
In summary, the evolving resource-based approach within the discipline of strategic 
management has developed important constructs to explain the extent and sustainability of 
competitive advantage as well as the appropriability of economic rents. Key contributions of 
the current paper are to join several important constructs from various sources within the 
extant research literature, and to provide the foundational market friction building blocks 
that underpin this resource-based approach.   21 
 
Look Ahead: A Theory of Economic Rents 
Now that we have shown that market frictions provide the theoretical foundations for 
explaining and predicting both the firm boundary and economic rent questions, we consider 
next steps for the resource-based approach. Currently, the market frictions logic is better 
developed for the firm  boundary question than  for explaining firm  economic rents. The 
current paper suggests, however, that more systematic theory development that utilizes the 
market frictions logic appears promising.  
Table 1 provides a brief comparison of extant research literature on firm boundary 
and economic rent questions derived from transaction costs and resource-based approaches. 
We organize this comparison along with key market friction constructs, and select important 
research from  these two approaches.  The evidence provided in  this  Table indicates  that 
market frictions logic is being used in both approaches but to different degrees in at least 
two  senses  of  the  term.  First,  transaction  costs  theory  has  progressed  by  more  self-
consciously  and  explicitly  using  the  extant  market  failures  literature  (Williamson  1975, 
1996), while the pattern of market frictions logic within the resource-based approach has 
been somewhat more emergent and implicit. We submit here, however, that we will now 
progress more rapidly through a systematic study of market frictions within our Strategy 
field.  Second,  several  market  friction  constructs  have  been  developed  with  a  depth  of 
theoretical and empirical research in transaction costs theory (Mahoney 2005; Williamson 
1996) while the corresponding resource-based approach is currently  less  developed.  For 
example, a potentially important market friction for future research in the resource-based 
approach is externalities, as well as the counterpart construct of firm-level spillovers. Such 22 
 
an inquiry may require an examination of real options, dynamic capabilities, and dynamic 
transaction cost approaches (Ghemawat 1993; Mahoney 2005).  
We propose here some paths in which the resource-based approach can be developed 
into a richer theory of economic rents and sustainable competitive advantage. First, a theory 
of rents must address not only potential economic value creation, but also realized value 
creation (Kim & Mahoney 2002). The resource-based logic in Barney (1991) and Peteraf 
(1993) offer key criteria for potential economic rents that can be derived from (a bundle of) 
resources. However, without well-defined property rights, including residual control rights 
and  residual  claimancy,  the  economic  value  creation  potential  of  a  certain  resource  or 
resource bundle may not be realized in full as predicted by the resource-based approach. A 
more systematic examination of market frictions in general and property rights (governance) 
in  particular  is  required  to  ascertain  the  economic  value  of  resources  and  capabilities 
(Makadok 2001; Mahoney 2005).  
Second,  a  theory  of  economic  rents  must  incorporate  (inter-divisional  and  inter-
temporal)  spillover  effects.  Focusing  on  the  transaction  as  the  unit  of  analysis  neglects 
spillover effects that can occur across multiple transactions (Argyres & Liebeskind 1999). 
Analogously,  utilizing  the  individual  resource  as  the  unit  of  analysis  will  have  similar 
limitations  since  it  may  neglect  important  spillover  costs  and  benefits  to  the  bundle  of 
resources that the decision-maker either currently possesses or may possess over time. A 
richer resource-based analysis of economic value creation will therefore be achieved with 
greater attention to inclusion of the spillover effects of resources in the decision calculus. 
Third, related to the concept of spillover effects, the unit of analysis in a theory of 
economic rents should not be confined to a single resource or even to a bundle of resources. 23 
 
For example, Porter and Siggelkow (2008) review research studies that focus on interactions 
among a system of activities of a firm, and suggest effects of the interactions on a firm’s 
sustainable competitive advantage. This line of research literature on activities (Kauffman 
1993; Milgrom & Roberts 1990) highlights a view of an activity system, which, we maintain, 
can be the unit of analysis for developing a theory of economic rents. An activity system 
view is complementary to the concept of resource (re)bundling processes in the resource-
based  approach  (Penrose  1959),  in  that  the  activity  system  approach  emphasizes  the 
complementarities  among  activities,  while  the  resource-based  approach  emphasizes  the 
complementarities among resources. The activity system approach can be applied not only 
to the firm’s boundary choice, but also to the search for economic rents. 
Fourth, in terms of econometric analysis, the challenging issues for testing trans-
action costs theory apply equally to testing the resource-based approach. Indeed, the funda-
mental premise within the strategic management field is that managerial decision-making in 
terms of governance decisions and the strategic choice of resource bundles are endogenous 
to their expected performance outcomes (Hamilton & Nickerson 2003). Therefore, more 
sophisticated econometric techniques (e.g., instrumental variable and two- and three-staged 
methods) are required to account for self-selection problems and unobserved heterogeneity 
(Heckman  1979;  Shaver  1998).  Failure  to  account  for  endogeneity  can  have  important 
consequences. For example, in transaction costs theory, Masten (1993) shows that within the 
context of make-or-buy decisions in the shipbuilding industry, the obtained OLS estimates 
are approximately 30% lower for the average make component and almost 50% lower for 
the typical buy component. Thus, the uncorrected model provides biased estimates of the 
costs of governance choice mistakes. In applying these econometric issues to the resource-24 
 
based  approach,  empirical  analysis  that  relates  R&D  intensity  directly  to  economic 
performance  may  provide  biased  coefficients  if  important  variables  such  as  firm-level 
resources and capabilities, which are correlated with R&D intensity, are omitted from the 
model specification. 
Finally, developing the market frictions logic within the resource-based approach is 
promising for providing practical implications for strategic managers. Indeed, such decision 
makers -- in parallel with researchers -- can proactively consider market frictions that enable 
cost minimization and the generation of firm-level economic rents. For example, managers 
can provide economic value in business situations where market frictions exist and therefore 
price signals are not perfect. Thus, the correct managerial calculus will include the spillover 
benefits and costs that are not typically priced in standard discount cash flow formulations. 
Such strategic connections show that the market frictions framework developed here enables 
us to better join Strategy theory and strategic management practice. 
These are challenging issues for further inquiry within organizational economics in 
general and for the resource-based approach in particular. It is anticipated here that a more 
systematic examination of market frictions for the study of firm boundary, firm heterogen-
eity and firm-level economic rents will enable the next generation of research within our 
evolving field of Strategy to do even better.   25 
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Figure 2: Market Frictions and Theoretical Questions
(c) Why do firms perform differently? 
(b)  Why do firms differ? 
(a)  Why do firms exist? 
Market frictions foundation 



























Figure 3: Economic Rents and Sustainable Competitive Advantages 
 
(c) The appropriability 
of economic rents 
(a)  The extent of 
competitive advantage 
1. Scarcity / Rare 























Externalities combined with positive transaction costs
Spillovers
Uncertainty 
Indivisibilities (production economies of scale)
Undefined and Poorly-Defined Property Rights
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Table 1: Market Frictions in Transaction Costs and Resource-based Approach 
1
st Order  Constructs Derived Constructs Transaction Costs Theory Resource-Based Approach
Bounded Rationality Causal Ambiguity
Simon (1947)
Williamson (1975)
Lippman & Rumelt (1982)




Walker & Weber (1984)
Foss (1996)
Mahoney (2001)
Trust/ Relational Experience Chiles & McMackin (1996) Conner & Prahalad (1996)
Ex Ante Adverse Selection Chi (1994) Kim & Mahoney (2006)
Ex Post Moral Hazard Chi (1994) Foss & Foss (2005)




Arrow & Hahn (1970) Lieberman & Montgomery (1988)Asset Specificity
(Uniqueness)
Asset Specificity Poppo & Zenger (1998) Yeoh & Roth (1999)
Asset Co-specialization Santoro & McGill (2005) Dyer (1996)
Asset Complementarities Teece (1986) Helfat (1997) 
Uncertainty
Technological Uncertainty Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt (1986) Song & Montoya-Weiss (2001)
Demand Uncertainty Walker & Weber (1984) Kor, Mahoney & Watson (2008)
Complexity
Task Programmability Eisenhardt (1988) Nickerson & Zenger (2004)
Social Programmability Ouchi (1980) Barney & Hansen (1994)
Asymmetric Information
Intangible Assets Arrow (1975) Brush & Artz (1999)
Tacit Knowledge Tan & Mahoney (2006) Szulanski (1996)
Externalities Public Goods Hennart (1988) Kim & Mahoney (2002)
Spillovers Knowledge Spillover Mayer & Salomon (2006) Kang, Mahoney & Tan (2009)